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People v. Perez - An Initial Look At The Sixth
Amendment Status Of Student Practice Rules
Despite the advent of the limited practice of law by law
students as early as 1957,' a California Court of Appeals' in 1978
became the first court to examine the sixth amendment status 3
of student representation in state criminal prosecutions. In
People v. Perez,4 a California appellate court concluded that a
lawyer-supervised law student, certified' for limited practice by
1. See, e.g., MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:11 (1957), reprinted in F. KLEIN, S. LELmKo,
& J. MAvrrY, BAR ADMISSION RULES AND STUDENT PRACTICE RULES 1064-65 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as STUDENT PRACTICE RULES]; Wyo. BAR R. 18 (1957), reprinted in
STUDENT PRACTICE RULES, supra, at 1155-57. Currently 47 states, the District of Columbia,
24 United States District Courts, and four United States Courts of Appeals have student
practice rules. See generally STUDENT PRACTICE RULES, supra, at 913-77.
For a thorough history of student practice and its pedagogic underpinnings, see
Student Practice as a Method of Legal Education and a Means of Providing Legal Assis-
tance to Indigents: An Empirical Study, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Empirical Study].
2. Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Division 1. Interestingly, prior to Perez, the
Fourth District was the only California Court of Appeals disallowing student practice
before its courts. Under the STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA RULES GOVERNING THE PRACTICAL
TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS (adopted 1970) [hereinafter cited as CAL. STATE BAR Rs.],
reprinted in STUDENT PRACICE RULES, supra note 1, at 1008-13, individual judges have
absolute discretion to permit or prohibit law student participation in proceedings before
them. CAL. STATE BAR Rs., supra, at VI.A.(3).
3. The sixth amendment provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court has applied the sixth amendment right to
counsel to state prosecutions through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Accord, United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Two state courts have dealt with appeal issues collateral to the sixth amendment
status of the participating law students. In State v. Daniels, 346 So. 2d 672 (La. 1977),
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant had fully consented to student
participation in his defense and no reversible error resulted from the substitution of a
second supervising attorney for the initial supervising attorney who was called out of town.
In People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975), the court held that
defense counsel's explicit announcement at the beginning of the trial that he was a certi-
fied law student satisfied the Michigan student practice rules and that the trial court had
no duty to advise defendant personally that his appointed counsel was a law student.
One commentator suggests student practice does not pose any threat to sixth amend-
ment rights; rather, carefully constructed programs for student representation contribute
meaningfully to the substantive right to counsel. See Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student
Soldiers, 45 B.U.L. REV. 445 (1965).
4. 147 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1978) (hearing granted by the California Supreme Court, Aug.
16, 1978) (no official citation exists for the Perez case because the supreme court's decision
to hear the Perez appeal vacated the appellate court decision, rendering it a nonopinion
unpublished in the official reporter).
5. Throughout this note, "certified law student" will mean a law student who has
been authorized for limited practice within a jurisdiction by complying with the require-
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the California Student Practice Rules,' is per se ineffective coun-
sel in felony trials.' Ostensibly to protect the defendant's right to
effective counsel,' Perez struck down the student practice rules
without considering the proper function of certification in sixth
amendment analysis.9 Moreover, the court misapplied sixth
amendment principles in concluding that the Constitution does
not allow student representation in felony trials, irrespective of
the presence of a supervising attorney at trial.
In Perez, although a licensed supervising attorney main-
tained full responsibility for the conduct of the case, the student
represented the defendant at trial. Prior to Perez's trial for
second-degree burglary, the court appointed as Perez's counsel a
deputy public defender, who then obtained the assistance of a law
student'" certified for limited practice by the California State
ments established by the authorizing body of the jurisdiction, generally the judiciary in
its rule-making capacity. For a tabloid survey of student practice rules throughout the
country, see STUDENT PRAccE RULES, supra note 1, at 960-77.
6. The California State Bar Association promulgated the student practice rules to
provide practical training in lawyering skills neglected by traditional legal education.
Memorandum of the State Bar of California at 21, In re of the Approval of the State Bar
of California Rules Governing the Practical Training of Law Students (submitted Sept.
5, 1978) (memorandum sought California Supreme Court approval nunc pro tunc of the
student practice rules) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
Although the California Supreme Court received copies of the California student
practice rules immediately after the State Bar adopted them, the court never officially
approved the rules. The Perez court concluded the rules authorized a species of admission
to practice unapproved by the supreme court. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 43. Thus the law student's
representation of Perez was the unlawful practice of law. Id. This conclusion prompted
the California Bar to submit the memorandum to the state supreme court. Supreme court
approval of the rules, however, does not resolve the constitutional issue the appellate court
raised sua sponte regarding the effectiveness of the student's representation. See 147 Cal.
Rptr. at 36, 43 n.3.
7. The court distinguished student representation in felony trials from student repre-
sentation in misdemeanor trials, concluding the sixth amendment permitted the latter but
prohibited the former. See 147 Cal. Rptr. at 39-41. The United States Supreme Court
decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), implicitly rejects this distinction
for purposes of substantive right to counsel analysis. See S. KRANTz, C. SMrrH, D. Ross-
MAN, P. FROYD, & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDATE OF
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 3-177 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. KRANTZ & C. SMrrIH]; notes
26, 29, & 35 infra.
8. For general examinations of the sixth amendment right to effective counsel, see
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CN. L. REv. 1 (1973); Brown, The
Trumpet Sounds-Gideon-A First Call to the Law School, 43 TEX. L. REv. 312 (1965);
Monaghan, supra note 3; Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground
for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964); Comment, A
Standard for the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 175 (1978).
9. See text accompanying notes 37-48 infra.
10. The student was actually a law school graduate awaiting the results of the bar
examination.
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Bar. With Perez's signed consent," the student appeared on be-
half of Perez at trial, conducting the defense under the deputy
defender's direct supervision. 2 As the attorney supervised in
silence, 3 the student examined witnesses, made objections and
motions, and presented the closing argument to the jury, who
ultimately'convicted Perez on the felony charge. 4 Perez ap-
pealed, contending that despite the presence of an attorney of
record, his representation by a law student violated his sixth
amendment right to assistance of counsel. 5In reviewing Perez's sixth amendment claim, the appellate
court treated the supervising attorney and the certified student
as individuals with separate duties rather than as a team with a
shared duty to render effective assistance. The court first re-
viewed the supervisxig attorney's role, holding his silent supervi-
sion amounted to pro forma representation lacking constitution-
11. CAL. STATE BAR Rs., supra note 2, at VI.A., requires the client's signed consent
as a condition to the student's appearance on the client's behalf at trial. The written
consent is evidence that the attorney of record fully informed the client about the law
student's role. The consent is not a waiver of the right to counsel because at all times a
licensed attorney is responsible for the student's work and must be personally present in
the courtroom.
12. Id. Rule VI.A. requires the personal and direct supervision of the attorney of
record whenever the certified student appears on the client's behalf in court. This provi-
sion protects the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to "counsel," traditionally
defined as licensed counsel. See, e.g., Huckleberry v. State, 337 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); People v. Washington, 87 Misc. 2d 103, 384 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
But see Monaghan, supra note 3, who argues that "Ithe question [under the sixth
amendment] is not whether the accused has been represented by a member of the bar,
but whether he has had the 'Assistance of Counsel.'" Id. at 458. Neither membership in
the bar nor its absence should be decisive. See generally note 40 infra and accompanying
text. See also CAL. STATE BAR Rs., supra note 2, at VII, outlining the activities in which a
certified student may engage under the general, rather than direct, supervision of the
licensed attorney.
13. The trial court record did not contain evidence of any official statements by the
deputy defender and did not reflect the nature or extent of any private conversations
between the attorney and the student. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 37. The attorney's silence implies
several interpretations, not the least plausible of which is that the student performed his
duties competently and did not require correction on the record. The Perez court, however,
chose not to examine the reason for the attorney's silence and thus avoided the substantive
scrutiny of the student's performance that may have explained the attorney's silence.
14. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
15. Perez did not contend the law student's representation was incompetent, and the
court did not review the student's actual performance. Id. at 43 n.3. Specifically, Perez
argued that 1) his representation by a certified law student was a waiver of his sixth
amendment right to counsel not knowingly and intelligently made; and 2) his representa-
tion by a law student, an unlicensed person, was a denial of his right to counsel. Id. at
36. The opinion suggests that Perez, who fully consented to the student's appearance, did
not understand the student's role because Perez spoke only Spanish and required an
interpreter throughout the trial. Id. at 40-41 & n.2.
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ally required zeal" and disqualified him as effective counsel
under sixth amendment principles.'7 Concerning the student's
participation, the court held the student's in-court representation
of Perez to be the unlawful practice of law by an unlicensed
person, without statutory or judicial authorization.' 8 The state
argued authorization existed under California certification
rules, 9 which permit a student, under a supervising attorney's
immediate guidance, to represent felony defendants. "' The court
rejected this argument on two grounds.2' First, the California
Supreme Court had not officially approved the rules promulgated
by the State Bar in 1970.22 As the only body empowered to confer
the right to practice law in California, the state supreme court's
failure to adopt the rules rendered them an invalid exercise of
licensing power by the State Bar. 23 Second, and more significant,
the Perez court interpreted the sixth amendment to the Federal
Constitution as proscribing supervised student representation in
felony trials.24
The Perez court's rationale for the sixth amendment pro-
scription of student felony representation has both a procedural
and a substantive dimension. The procedural aspect of the deci-
sion inheres in the court's reliance on Justice Brennan's concur-
ring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin.25 In Argersinger, the
United States Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to all
criminal defendants facing possible imprisonment.26 In his con-
16. "The Constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only
be attained where counsel acts in the role of active advocate in behalf of his client .... "
Id. at 37 (citing from Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)). See note 13 supra.
17. See 147 Cal. Rptr. at 36. Cf. Comment, supra note 8 (The author describes various
conduct of defense counsel that does or does not qualify as effective assistance under the
sixth amendment.). See generally S. KRANTZ & C. SMITH, supra note 7.
18. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 37. In the court's view, appearance before a judicial body on
behalf of a client "is the highest point of the [attorney's] calling." Id. In defending Perez
at a felony trial, the certified student engaged in an activity traditionally regarded as the
practice of law.
19. CAL. STAT' BAR Rs., supra note 2.
20. Id. at VI.A.
21. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 37-39.
22. See note 6 supra.
23. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 38. The California State Bar is authorized to adopt regulations
deemed necessary or advisable for effectuating the qualifications for admissions to the
practice of law. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6047 (West 1974).
24. See note 7 supra.
25. 407 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1972). For an extensive study of the Argersinger mandate, with
ideas for implementing both its plain meaning and spirit, see S. KRANrrz & C. SMrTH, supra
note 7.
26. The Supreme Court held "that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
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curring opinion Justice Brennan voiced an expectation that stu-
dents could make a significant contribution to the representation
of the poor in many cases, including those reached by the
Argersinger decision. 7 Because Argersinger involved a misde-
meanor charge, the Perez court interpreted Justice Brennan's
concurrence procedurally as restricting student representation to
misdemeanor cases.25 The substantive aspect, which focuses on
defense counsel's actual performance,29 surfaces in the court's
discussion of the professional capabilities of student counsel .3o By
contrasting in the abstract "the conceded premise of the incom-
pleteness of the training of the law student with the competence
requirement of the licensed attorney in the trial arena,"3' the
court concluded, without examining the student's individual per-
formance, that law students, as a class, are inherently incompe-
tent to handle felony representation. 32
The Perez court's summary conclusion that the certified stu-
dent was per se ineffective counsel failed to advance the substan-
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial." 407 U.S. at 37. Cf. S. KRANTz & C.
SMrrH, supra note 7, at 26 ("[The importance placed on loss of liberty in the Argersinger
case will have reverberations in any due process analysis of whether right to counsel is
required in areas such as civil commitment, civil contempt, and pre-trial diversion.").
27. 407 U.S. at 40 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40. "We conclude the Argersinger decision does not give
constitutional aura to the activities of [the student] in this case." Id. at 40.
29. In contemporary sixth amendment analysis involving competency of counsel, the
appellate review focuses on the quality of defense counsel's actual performance. This
methodology necessarily requires scrutiny on a case-by-case basis because substantive
right to counsel principles protect a defendant's right to have competent assistance in each
and every case. A theoretical generality cannot resolve the issue of counsel's competence
in a specific case. See Bazelon, supra note 8; Comment, supra note 8; Comment, 24
RUTGERS L. REv. 378 (1970).
30. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43.
31. Id. at 42.
32. Id. at 43. The court derived its "conceded premise" from one commentary, which
relied on another commentary dating back to 1958. The court said:
An experienced trial judge can only watch with horror as a neophyte destroys
his own case by inept questioning. The immediate presence of the experienced
lawyer cannot undo the harm done by a single disastrous question. . . . There
may be but one moment of time in the course of a trial when the right act, word,
or decision can be made and the case won.
Id. at 42. No precedent supports the court's conclusion that the alleged inexperience of
defense counsel, without more, renders his representation constitutionally infirm. See
Waltz, supra note 8; Comment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 378 (1970). Inexperience and incom-
petence are not synonomous, and today, because of the pervasive use of clinical programs,
inexperience is not necessarily coextensive with the status of student. See STUDENT PRAC-
TICE RULES, supra note 1, at 913-41; Bird, The Clinical Defense Seminar: A Methodology
for Teaching Legal Process & Professional Responsibility, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 246 (1974);
Empirical Study, supra note 1; Gorman, Clinical Legal Education: A Prospectus, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 537 (1971).
19791 Student Practice Rules
tive sixth amendment guarantee of representation by reasonably
competent counsel.13 Although the student's involvement at trial
presented a novel sixth amendment appeal, 3 an analogue existed
in challenges to counsel's effectiveness involving a licensed attor-
ney. Under modern sixth amendment analysis, 5 the mere pres-
ence of the licensed attorney at trial is not decisive, but is only a
consideration in determining whether defendant received reason-
ably effective assistance .3  Membership in the bar serves as evi-
dence that counsel is minimally qualified and thus reasonably
likely to be effective. Bar membership alone, however, cannot
answer whether counsel in fact rendered effective aid in any par-
ticular case.37 Only by scrutinizing counsel's individual perform-
ance in a specific case, can a court truly determine whether coun-
sel rendered constitutionally adequate assistance.
In Perez, the law student's compliance with the California
student practice rules serves a function analogous to the licensed
attorney's membership in the bar. Certification is evidence that
the student is reasonably likely to be effective in performing the
authorized activities. Certification requirements, like bar mem-
33. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
34. The court had not previously entertained an appeal challenging the validity of
the student practice rules or contending a certified student rendered ineffective represen-
tation. See note 3 supra.
35. Prior to 1960, most jurisdictions regarded the right to counsel as a procedural
rather than a substantive right and, consequently, granted post-conviction relief only
when representation was so lacking in competence that it reduced the trial to a "mock-
ery of justice." Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945). This stringent standard imposed upon defendant a heavy burden to show unfair-
ness in the trial as a whole. Because defense counsel can render ineffective assistance
without reducing the trial to a mockery of justice, substandard representation passed
defendants' challenges. See Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974). Accord,
Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from
Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927, 928-29 (1973):
It may be something of a puzzle to outsiders why lawyers, who demand so much
of other professionals, ask so little of themselves. Doctors, after all, owe their
patients much more than a mockery of medicine. But the mockery-of-justice
standard does not really reflect the standard of performance which defense
lawyers owe their clients.
In 1960, the Fifth Circuit adopted a substantive standard focusing specifically on defense
counsel's performance rather than on the fairness of the trial as a whole. MacKenna v.
Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.), modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
877 (1961). See Comment, supra note 8.
36. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Accord, David, Institutional or Pri-
vate Counsel: A Judge's View of the Public Defender System, 45 MINN. L. REv. 753, 760
(1961) ("The presumption that all persons licensed to practice are competent to handle
all legal matters is refuted every day.").
37. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 458.
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bership, assure minimum qualifications for the scope of practice
involved. Once a student satisfies those requirements a court
should presume the student's competence to render assistance
within the scope of authorized activities. Rather than presuming
the student's competence and inquiring whether the student in
fact rendered reasonably effective assistance, the Perez court
summarily found ineffective representation.
The Perez per se rule creates an absolute bar to felony repre-
sentation by students identified by a licensing body as qualified
to satisfy sixth amendment guarantees under specified condi-
tions. In proposing the practice rules, the California State Bar
determined that certified students under direct supervision are
presumptively capable of furnishing constitutionally effective
assistance to all defendants.3 As the legislative and administra-
tive branch of the California Supreme Court, 9 the only govern-
mental body with the power to admit persons to the practice of
law,40 the State Bar acted pursuant to its statutory duty4' in
promulgating the rules. By authorizing supervised student partic-
ipation in activities formerly restricted to licensed attorneys,42
certification encourages students to develop the practical skills
often neglected by traditional legal education. 3 The student does
38. See Memorandum, supra note 6, at 39. Although the student's compliance with
certification requirements creates a presumption of the student's ability to be effective
within the scope of authorized activities, the court, when reviewing defendant's challenge
to counsel's competence, must determine whether the student in fact rendered constitu-
tionally adequate assistance. See MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.), modified,
289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
39. See Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 548, 354 P.2d 637, 7
Cal. Rptr. 109 (1960); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6047, 6060-6068 (West 1974).
40. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39. See Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P.2d 697,
19 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962). The United States Supreme Court has let the states define"counsel" and regulate the practice of law within their boundaries, limited only by federal
constitutional protections. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217 (1967). In nearly every state the power resides with the judiciary, which, in its rule-
making capacity, establishes minimum licensing requirements for the legal profession. See
State v. Cook, 84 Wash. 2d 342, 525 P.2d 761 (1974); S. KRANTz & C. SMrrH, supra note
7, at 264-66.
41. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6031, 6047 (West 1974). The State Bar has express
statutory authority to aid in the improvement of the administration of justice, which
undoubtedly includes improving the training and educating of lawyers.
42. See, e.g., Ky. Sup. CT. R. 2.540 (1978), reprinted in STUDENT PlAMCrE RULES,
supra note 1, at 1053-54; MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:11 (1978), reprinted in STUDENT PRAC-
TICE RULES, supra note 1, at 1064-65. All jurisdictions authorizing student practice permit
trial work to varying degrees. Id. at 960-69.
43. As a general rule, law schools use the "case method" approach to legal education.
The case method employs a questioning process to induce substantive analysis, but offers
no training in client counseling, interviewing, negotiating, preparation of court docu-
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not practice, however, at the expense of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights because the rules require the student's academic pre-
paredness," the defendant's consent upon full disclosure of the
student's role,45 the supervising attorney's personal presence at
the student's court appearance," and the attorney's assumption
of personal professional responsibility for the student's work.,7
The Perez court refused to defer to the State Bar's judgment that
these requirements guarantee the student's minimum qualifica-
tions and provide basic protections to the client." In its appellate
capacity, the Perez court's responsibility was not to review the
validity of certification rules the state judiciary promulgated
under its rule-making authority," but to determine if validly
licensed or certified counsel actually rendered effective assist-
ance.50 The court failed in its appellate function by summarily
ments, or trial advocacy. See STUDENT PRACTICE RULES, supra note 1, at 913-41; Bird, supra
note 32; Empirical Study, supra note 1; Gorman, supra note 32.
44. A participating student must have successfully completed at least three semesters
of law school, CAL. STATE BAR Rs., supra note 2, at III.B.(3)(a)-(b) (or two years of other
law study, id. at Ill.B.(3)(c)-(d)), and the law school dean or specified alternates must
certify the student's ability and character.
45. Id. at VI.A. See note 11 supra.
46. CAL. STATE BAR Rs., supra note 2, at VI.A.(3).
For the protection of the client and public and to insure the validity of the
experience from an educational standpoint, the personal presence of the super-
vising attorney is required in certain especially important instances . . . and in
all criminal matters where the right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution
or statute.
Memorandum, supra note 6, at 54 (quoting from Annual Report of the Board of Governors,
44 STATE BAR J. 616, 631 (1969)).
The Perez court incorrectly regarded defendant's signed consent as a waiver of the
right to counsel, despite the trial court's appointment of a deputy defender as the attorney
of record and the attorney's presence in court at trial. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 43. See note 11
supra. Cf. Ky. SuP. CT. R. 2.540, reprinted in STUDENT PRACTICE RULES, supra note 1, at
1053-54 (Kentucky's student practice rules do not require the supervising attorney's per-
sonal presence in court in criminal cases involving fines of less than $500 or imprisonment
of less than 12 months.).
47. CAL. STATE BAR Rs., supra note 2, at V.C. See notes 11 & 46 supra.
48. Although not inconceivable, a court's substantive scrutiny of licensing require-
ments for the legal profession is improbable, because the judiciary itself through the state
supreme court generally determines who is qualified to practice law. See State v. Cook,
84 Wash. 2d 342, 525 P.2d 761 (1974); J. FISCHER & D. LACHMANN, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDA-
TION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK (1972). A lower court sitting as adjudicator of a
controversy is not free to review licensing requirements established by the highest court
in the state through its legislative branch. The Perez court in its appellate role did not
have the discretion to ignore, or the power to abrogate, the practice rules promulgated by
the legislative branch of the California Supreme Court.
49. The State Bar formulated the rules pursuant to its statutory duty "to aid in all
matters pertaining to the advancement of the science of jurisprudence or to the improve-
ment of the administration of justice." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6031 (West 1974).
50. See notes 6, 29, 35, & 48 supra.
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proscribing student felony representation, rather than conduct-
ing a substantive review of the student's performance as coun-
sel."
The Perez court, moreover, misapprehended the import of
Argersinger v. Hamlin.512 In Argersinger, the United States Su-
preme Court extended the substantive sixth amendment right to
effective counsel to all defendants facing possible imprisonment,53
abrogating the felony/misdemeanor distinction that traditionally
determined which defendants merited the assistance of counsel.54
Because Argersinger establishes loss of liberty as the benchmark
for the right to counsel, statutory labels of felony and misde-
meanor should not affect the substance of the right. 55 Although
in sixth amendment analysis, the minimum constitutional stan-
dard of effectiveness56 is identical for misdemeanor and felony
representation,, a state, as a matter of policy, may provide felony
defendants more protection than the constitutionally required
minimum.57 Thus, although a state may use the felony/nonfelony
distinction to limit the scope of student practice within its juris-
diction to nonfelony cases, the distinction does not affect the
constitutional scope of student practice; that is, a state, constitu-
tionally may extend its student practice to felony cases. 58
Notwithstanding Argersinger, the Perez court concluded the
felony/nonfelony distinction persists under sixth amendment
51. See notes 13, & 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
52. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See note 7 supra, and notes 25-28 supra and accompanying
text.
53. See notes 7 & 26 supra.
54. The Court concluded imprisonment is no less onerous because it results from
conviction of a misdemeanor rather than a felony. 407 U.S. at 37.
55. See id. at 37. But cf. S. Ka.rAz & C. Sami, supra note 7, at 168 (Argersinger
did not address the question of what would constitute effective assistance in nonfelony
cases and the nature of misdemeanor crimes requires a different emphasis in non-felony
cases).
56. Because the United States Supreme Court has never clearly defined "effective
assistance," no uniform standard of review exists. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214
(8th Cir. 1974). For an extensive and thorough analysis of the variety of standards used
by the states and federal circuits, see Comment, supra note 8.
57. Had the California State Bar decided as a policy matter to restrict supervised
student representation to traditional misdemeanor cases, the Perez court would have been
justified in concluding the law student exceeded his authority. Constitutional standards
prescribe minimum protections and a state has the power to establish more protective
standards. The Perez court, however, based its decision on constitutional principles rather
than state policy. In concluding the right to counsel acknowledges a felony/nonfelony
distinction, the court misinterpreted Argersinger. See S. KRANTZ & C. SMrrH, supra note
7, at 168.
58. See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
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analysis." Despite the State Bar's provision of the same mini-
mum constitutional protections for all misdemeanor and felony
defendants with respect to the right to counsel, 0 the Perez court
concluded a felony defendant deserved greater constitutional
protection.' In citing Justice Brennan's Argersinger concurrence
as authority for prohibiting student representation in felony
trials,6" the Perez court ignored an alternative interpretation of
the Brennan concurrence. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Douglas and Stewart, acknowledged with approval that in 1972
approximately thirty-eight states had certification rules permit-
ting law students to make supervised court appearances as de-
fense counsel. 3 The Justices expressly stated that law students
could contribute significantly to the representation of the poor,
including those who have a constitutional right to counsel. 4 Be-
cause the statutory felony/misdemeanor distinction has no role in
right to counsel analysis,65 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
reasonably is read not only to approve, but to encourage super-
vised student representation in all cases involving the right to
counsel.6 In restricting the constitutional scope of student prac-
tice to misdemeanor trials, the Perez court misapplied the sixth
amendment right to counsel principles established in
Argersinger.
At a time when innovative educators, jurists, and practition-
ers are expanding, through limited practice programs, the lawyer-
ing experiences available to law students, Perez marks an un-
59. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
60. CAL. STATE BAR Rs., supra note 2, at VI.A.
61. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41.
62. Id. at 39, citing 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See notes 25-28
supra and accompanying text.
63. 407 U.S. at 40-41.
64. Id.
65. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
66. Justice Brennan wrote his short concurring opinion simply to add an observation
about the majority's discussion of legal resources available to meet the demand for counsel
created by Argersinger: "Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide an
important source of legal representation for the indigent." 407 U.S. at 40. Cf. Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (The Court invalidated a regulation prohibiting prisoners from
assisting one another with habeas corpus applications and other legal matters as violative
of prisoners' constitutional right of access to the courts. The Court acknowledged with
approval a proposed law school clinical program targeted to assist prisoners with habeas
applications.); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (The Court invalidated Califor-
nia regulations barring law students employed by lawyers representing prisoners from
interviewing inmate clients.); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (The use of law
students either as volunteers or in formal clinical programs is a means by which a state
can meet its constitutional duty to assure prisoners meaningful access to the courts.).
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healthy retreat. Law students can contribute both qualitatively
and quantitatively to the representation of the poor if the legal
community furnishes encouragement and guidance. Student
practice rules not only enable students to assist the legal profes-
sion in its duty to provide quality legal services to all, but also
allow students to develop the lawyering skills essential to profes-
sional competence. The more expansive the practice rules made
available to students, the better prepared students will be to
respond competently and sensivitively to the diverse and inevi-
table challenges of practice.*
Catherine Walker
* Editor's note: On April 26, 1979, the California Supreme Court upheld Perez's
conviction of second degree burglary in concluding that a defendant "who has received
reasonably competent representation pursuant to a program replete with safeguards de-
signed to ensure the competency of representation has not been denied his constitutional
right to assistance of counsel merely because one of the two persons who appeared on his
behalf was not yet a member of the bar." People v. Perez, __ Cal. 3d . . 594
P.2d -, - 155 Cal. Rptr. 176, 182 (1979).
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